Major General George G. Meade, the Victor of Gettysburg.
Why Has History Forgotten Him?

According to Civil War Times Illustrated, August 2002, General George Gordon Meade was "forgotten, overlooked, and ignored in his own time" for seven reasons:

1.	The decision not to pursue Lee. Meade was probably right not to attack Lee after the Battle of Gettysburg. It might have undone a very- substantial Union victory, and he was in no condition to commit troops to further combat. Most of the criticism toward him came from civilian officials; who were not present with the army. Most knowledgeable military officers offered praise, including two of his predecessors--Generals McClellan and Hooker.
2.	The decision not to attack at Mine Run. By late November, 1863, Meade had positioned his army along the banks of Mine Run, a tributary of Virginia's Rapidan River; Lee was situated on the opposite bank. Meade was cautious, but neither indecisive nor a procrastinator--he would attack under proper circumstances. However, Major General Warren crossed enemy lines and observed that Confederate defenses. They were so formidable that an attack would bring certain disaster. Meade rode to the scene and saw for himself that an order to advance would sacrifice thousands of lives for no gain, so he reluctantly called off the attack. Politicians and newspapers criticized him, but Federal army officers again praised him for knowing when to fight and when not to fight.
3.	The enmity of Senator Zachariah Chandler. At the outbreak of the war, authorities in Detroit ordered all civilian and military officials to renew their oath of allegiance to the United States. Meade responded that he took his orders from Washington, not Detroit, and with some other officers signed a statement stating such. The defection of two fellow officers to the Confederacy, however, damaged his credibility; Senators Chandler and Wade, members of the widely feared and despised Committee on the Conduct of the War, tried to persuade Lincoln and Grant to remove Meade from command. While Lincoln and Grant both refused, Meade's reputation was hurt enough to delay his approval for promotion to major general until February 1865.
4.	The enmity of Daniel Sickles. In attempting to cover his own deficiencies, Sickles did his best to destroy Meade, never missing an opportunity to feature himself as a savior at the Battle of Gettysburg and Meade as a timid commander who wanted only to retreat. On the second day at Gettysburg, Meade ordered Sickles to post his corps along Cemetery Ridge. Sickles, however, felt he knew better than his commanding officer, and marched his corps out to the Emmetsburg Rd. and the Peach Orchard instead. Meade twice berated Sickles in front of the other officers and troops for disobeying orders, ordering him to return to his original position; Sickles tried to comply, but it was too late, as the Confederate Assault had already commenced. Meade seems to have been the type of person to lose his temper, then regret it later and try to salve the wounds he had inflicted with gracious reports. Sickles, however, never let go of his anger. He felt that Meade had publicly humiliated him, questioning his honor and abilities, and he devoted much of the rest of his long life to seeking revenge via tarnishing Meade's reputation.
5.	The 'historicus' letter. The New York Herald on March 12, 1864 printed a letter that claimed to be an accurate account of the second day's fighting at Gettysburg. It stated that Sickles' corps saved the day for the Union cause inferred that the other commanders were so blundering and ineffective that without Sickles they would have lost the battle. The letter was signed "Historicus," almost certainly a pseudonym for Sickles himself, of one of his staff officers, perhaps John Batchelder who later was appointed by the federal government as the official historian of the Battle of Gettysburg. Because it was published in a widely read New York newspaper, it had wide-ranging influence. Concerned for his and his army's reputation, Meade urged Secretary of War Edwin Stanton to confront Sickles about this verbal attack. Stanton notified Lincoln, but neither put much energy into defending Meade, who was later forced to testify before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. The committee was satisfied with Meade's explanations, but that there was an interrogation severely damaged Meade's reputation. Meade additionally never wrote memoirs, and died shortly after the conclusion of the War from the lingering effects of his near mortal wound at Glendale, so his version of events could not compete with Sickles' years of attacks.
6.	The rise of Philip Sheridan. When Sheridan became commander of the Cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, he now took his orders from Grant, not Meade. He had always rankled at taking orders from Meade, but did not set out deliberately to undercut him through innuendo and gossip. Rather, his battlefield successes made him a hero, the press compared him with Grant, and Sheridan eagerly gave himself all the credit. While Meade did not deserve to be overshadowed, he seemed to feel uncomfortable about self-promotion. He was from an old Philadelphia family that had played important roles in the formative history of the United States, but they were the type to deflect praise and not tout their own accomplishments. They believed in 'noblesse oblige' where the elite served because it was right to do so for its own sake, not for self-promotion.
7.	Meade's mishandling of Edward Cropsey. Many generals had stormy relationships with war correspondents, but knew how to manipulate the press to advantage. Meade was clumsy at public relations, and suffered a disastrous run-in with a war correspondent that he later described as "one of the greatest mistakes of my life." Edward Cropsey, a reporter for the Philadelphia Inquirer, printed a rumor circulating in the Army of the Potomac that Meade had wanted to retreat after the Battle of the Wilderness, and that Grant alone had saved the army. Enraged, Meade had Cropsey arrested and publicly humiliated. He later reconciled with him, but it was too late--war correspondents had already met and decided that Meade's name would never again be mentioned in print unless it was unfavorable. Whatever went right was credited to Grant or Sheridan, everything wrong was blamed on Meade. His reputation was destroyed. Meade's troops did play a crucial role in defeating the Confederacy, but he gets little credit for his efforts in history.